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Criminal Law
By REBECCA M. OVERSTREET* AND JEAN COLLIER*"
INTRODUCTION
Before the state can impose a criminal penalty it must
prove that the proscribed act, actus reus, was accompanied by
a culpable mental state,1 the mens rea. The Kentucky Penal
Code,2 which became effective January 1, 1975, details these
culpable mental states. Specifically, Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes (KRS) § 501.020 defines the requisite mental state3 while
KRS § 504.020 codifies the common law standard for excul-
pating the defendant because of mental disease or defect.
4
This survey examines the Kentucky appellate courts' inter-
pretation of these statutes, focusing principally on the re-
quirements placed upon defendants pleading insanity or di-
minished capacity.
I. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A basic tenet of our criminal justice system is that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all ele-
ments of the crime charged in order to convict the defendant.
5
The reasonable doubt standard is afforded the accused to pro-
tect him from the consequences of an unwarranted convic-
tion.' This prosecutorial burden has on numerous occasions
* Assistant Commonwealth Attorney, Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky. B.S.
1974, Eastern Kentucky University; J.D. 1977, University of Kentucky.
** J.D. 1980, University of Kentucky.
I Ky. REV. STAT. § 501.030 (1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 KRS chs. 500-34 (1975).
3 KRS § 501.020 (1975) defines the mental states of "intentionally", "know-
ingly," "wantonly," and "recklessly".
4 K. Brickey, KENTucKY CRIMINAL LAW § 5.02, at 43 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
BRICKEY].
5 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting);
Briwegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). See also Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453 (1895). That the reasonable doubt standard is of constitutional magni-
tude was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in In re Winship: "Lest
there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
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conflicted with the concept of an affirmative defense,7 where
the burden of production and, in some instances, the burden
of persuasion on that affirmative defense is shifted to the de-
fendant." Like other defenses, however, the defendant need
raise an affirmative defense only after the prosecution has
proven each element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt."
A. Burden of Proof of Insanity
As a result of judicial experience with the insanity de-
fense 10 and the presumption that most men are sane,1 the de-
fendant bears the burden of proof' 2 as to his insanity. In Le-
land v. Oregon13 the United States Supreme Court upheld
this shifting of the burden of proof, rejecting the contention
that due process requires the state to carry the burden of
proof of sanity. The Court held that an Oregon statute requir-
ing the defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt fell within the "'limits of accepted notions of jus-
tice' ,,14 and was in accord with "generally accepted concepts
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
7 The treatment of an affirmative defense may be characterized as a rebuttable
presumption. When an affirmative defense is at issue, the lack of mitigation or ab-
sence of the defense is treated as a presumed fact. This presumption is settled in
favor of the prosecution unless the defendant provides sufficient evidence to negate
it. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
8 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2501 (3rd ed. 1940).
9 See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 314, at 800-01 (2d ed. 1972).
10 9 J. WIGmoE, EVIDENCE § 2501, at 361 (3rd ed. 1940).
" Kriel v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 362 (1869); Graham v. Common-
wealth, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 468 (1855).
'2 What commonly is referred to as the burden of proof actually consists of two
separate burdens: the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion. The bur-
den of production on an issue is "the liability to an adverse ruling ... if the evidence
on the issue has not been produced." C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336, at 784
(2d ed. 1972). In meeting the burden the parties "must first satisfy the judge that
they have a quantity of evidence fit to be considered by the jury, and to form a
reasonable basis for the verdict." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487, at 279 (3rd ed.
1940). The risk of nonpersuasion "is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the alleged fact is true." C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336, at 783-84 (2d ed.
1972).
13 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
14 Id. at 799 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)).
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of basic standards of justice.' 15
Courts and legislatures almost uniformly have shifted to
the defendant the burden of proving his insanity,"6 but two
approaches have emerged in delineating the extent of the de-
fendant's burden. While it is clear that the defendant must
carry the initial burden of production of evidence, jurisdic-
tions have split almost evenly respecting which side then
bears the risk of nonpersuasion. Twenty-two states17 and the
District of Columbia' 8 require the defendant to demonstrate
his insanity to the jury by a preponderance of the evidence.
Thus the presumption of sanity continues to operate until the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence persuades the
jury of its inapplicability. The federal courts 9 and twenty-six
states20 have rejected that standard and require the prosecu-
16 Id. at 799.
16 See notes 17-20 and accompanying text infra for further discussion of the rele-
vant statutes and cases.
17 Six of the states have enacted the requirement by statute: ALA. CODE § 15-16-2
(1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304, 401(a); LA. CODE CraM. PRO. ANN. §§ 432, 439
(West 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.025 (West 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-
503(a) (1947); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.055(2), 161.305 (1977). The remaining sixteen
states, including Kentucky, by judicial decision require the defendant to prove his
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence: Stanley v. State, 454 S.W.2d 72 (Ark.
1970); People v. Kelly, 516 P.2d 875 (Cal. 1973); Durham v. State, 238 S.E.2d 334
(Ga. 1977); Henderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. 1974); State v. Collins,
297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972); State v. Holmes, 439 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1969); Phillips v.
State, 475 P.2d 671 (Nev. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971); State v. DiPaglia,
315 A.2d 385 (N.J. 1974); State v. Harris, 28 S.E.2d 232 (N.C. 1943); State v. Staten,
267 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio 1971); vacated and remanded on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938
(1972); State v. Nault, 314 A.2d 627 (R.I. 1974); State v. Hinson, 172 S.E.2d 548 (S.C.
1970); Breland v. State, 489 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 157 S.E.2d 185 (Va. 1967); State v. Canaday, 488
P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1971), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 408 U.S. 940
(1972); State v. Grimm, 195 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1973).
Is D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 24-301 (West Supp. 1978-79). See United States v.
Greene, 489 F.2d 1145 (D.C. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
1" Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
20 Three states have done so by statute: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083(b) (1972) (as
construed by Dolchok v. State, 519 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1974)), labels insanity an affirm-
ative defense but places the burden of persuasion on the prosecution following the
defendant's production of any "evidence"; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-105(2) (1973) (see
also People v. Ware, 528 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1974)); Wyo. STAT. 7-11-305(b) (1977) (see
also Reilly v. State, 496 P.2d 899 (Wyo. 1972)). The remaining twenty-three have
instituted the prosecutorial burden by judicial decision: State v. Begay, 516 P.2d 573
(Ariz. 1973); State v. Dubina, 318 A.2d 95 (Conn. 1972); Byrd v. State, 297 So.2d 22
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tion to prove the defendant's sanity, after the defendant has
met the initial burden of production, to the same degree as
every other element of the offense-beyond a reasonable
doubt.
B. The Defendant's Burden of Proof in Kentucky
Before the adoption of Kentucky's new penal code, a de-
fendant attempting to rely on an insanity defense was re-
quired to raise the issue through the introduction of evidence
and to persuade the jury by a preponderance of the evidence
of his insanity.21 Section 504.020(3) of the new penal code
adopts this prior law.22 In Wiseman v. Commonwealth23 the
Kentucky Supreme Court considered the collateral issue of
whether the prosecution is required to rebut the defendant's
evidence of his insanity.
The defendant in Wiseman appealed his conviction of
voluntary manslaughter, arguing that the trial court erred in
not directing a verdict of not guilty, since the prosecution
failed to rebut the defendant's clear and convincing evidence
that at the time of the killing he did not have the substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of the act nor to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument and
held that the record clearly demonstrated that the jury had
sufficient basis for finding the defendant sane at the time of
(Fla. 1974); State v. Moeller, 433 P.2d 136 (Hawaii 1967); State v. Myers, 494 P.2d
574 (Idaho 1972); People v. Hawkins, 290 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 1972); Young v. State, 280
N.E.2d 595 (Ind. 1972); State v. Thomas, 219 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 1974); State v. Chase,
480 P.2d 62 (Kan. 1971); Fowler v. State, 206 A.2d 802 (Md. 1965); Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1967); People v. Woody, 157 N.W.2d 201 (Mich.
1968); Myrick v. State, 290 So.2d 259 (Miss. 1974); State v. Jacobs, 205 N.W.2d 662
(Neb.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 860 (1973); State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224 (1861); State
v. James, 511 P.2d 556 (N.M. 1973); People v. Silver, 310 N.E.2d 520 (N.Y. 1974);
Kehnamer v. State, 57 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1936); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 321 A.2d
627 (Pa. 1974); State v. Kindvall, 191 N.W.2d 289 (S.D. 1971); Collins v. State, 506
S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Holt, 449 P.2d 119 (Utah 1969); State
v. Bishop, 260 A.2d 393 (Vt. 1969).
2! Abbott v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W. 196 (Ky. 1900); Moore v. Commonwealth,
18 S.W. 833 (Ky. 1892); Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W. 475 (Ky. 1889).
22 Ky. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 note (Baldwin 1975).
587 S.W.2d 235 (Ky. 1979).
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the commission of the crime, thus the verdict was not clearly
unreasonable.24 Relying on Tunget v. Commonwealth,15 the
Court stated that even though all of the expert witnesses tes-
tified that the accused was insane, any evidence indicative of
his sanity created a factual issue for the jury.2"
At first glance it appears that Wiseman only reaffirms
earlier precedent,27 as it is well settled in Kentucky that per-
sons who are not experts, but by association and observation
have had an opportunity to form an opinion as to the sanity
of an individual, may testify to that opinion.28 The important
aspect of Wiseman is that the Court explicitly did not require
the prosecution to produce any rebuttal evidence as to the de-
fendant's sanity, allowing the jury to rely on the direct evi-
dence presented by the Commonwealth on that issue.29 Al-
though it is clear that rebuttal evidence is not statutorily
required where the defendant raises an affirmative defense, 0
24 Id. at 237-38. In Wiseman the evidence presented consisted of the following:
after a high school basketball game the defendant and his wife attended a party at a
neighbor's apartment. While the defendant's wife was talking with the neighbor,
Perry Joe Madden, the defendant entered the room and stated in a serious tone,
"'Perry, I'm sorry but I'm the jealous type.'" Id. at 237. The defendant and his wife
then returned to their apartment. Sometime between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. the
defendant and his wife checked into a local motel. Later that evening the defendant
was found scuffling with another guest on the balcony. The defendant's wife's body
was found in the motel room. While being transported to jail the defendant pounded
his head against the wire screen between the front and back seats in the cruiser. Id.
at 236-37.
Both Madden and the motel clerk testified that the defendant had not acted
strangely the night before the murder. Additionally, three psychiatrists testified that
the defendant "lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Id. at 237. There was
additional evidence presented regarding the defendant's past bouts with mental ill-
ness and previous psychiatric hospitalizations. Id.
25 198 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1947). See also Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d
628 (Ky. 1978); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1977); Terry v.
Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963).
26 587 S.W.2d at 238.
217 Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1977); Terry v. Common-
wealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963); Tunget v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.2d 785 (Ky.
1947).
2s Burgess v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1978); Jewell v. Common-
wealth, 549 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1977); Banks v. Commonwealth, 141 S.W. 380 (Ky.
1911); Abbott v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W. 196 (Ky. 1900).
29 587 S.W.2d at 237-38.
30 KRS § 500.070 (1975). The prosecution is required to present rebuttal evi-
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this decision resolves the question of any judicially fashioned
requirement that the prosecution must always present evi-
dence in rebuttal of the defendant's evidence of his insanity.
Wiseman does, however, raise the issue of when the pros-
ecution must in fact produce evidence in rebuttal of the de-
fendant's evidence of his insanity. A test propounded by the
Court for ruling on motions for a directed verdict of acquittal
assists in resolving this issue:
Running throughout the decisions, and the slightly va-
rying language in which the rule has been stated, the ele-
ment of reasonableness is constant. If the totality of the evi-
dence is such that the judge can conclude that reasonable
minds might fairly find guilt beyond reasonable doubt, then
the evidence is sufficient, albeit circumstantial. If the evi-
dence cannot meet that test, it is insufficient.31
Therefore, the judge must decide whether on the basis of the
evidence before the court a reasonable jury could believe to
the exclusion of a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of the offense charged. If the evidence before the court
would allow the judge to reach this conclusion, then the Com-
monwealth is under no burden to rebut the defendant's proof
of insanity. The principal advantage of such a test is that the
court will be making a decision similar to the one required in
responding to motions for directed verdicts for failure of the
prosecution to prove an affirmative element of the crime; 32
thus it will enable the court to utilize its past experience.
II. UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDE AND THE DEFENSE OF
DIMINISHED CAPACITY
In Robinson v. Commonwealth33 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals considered whether evidence of a defendant's mental
retardation is admissible in a case of reckless homicide. Verna
dence where "the evidence tending to support the defense is of such probative force
that in absence of countervailing evidence the defendant would be entitled to a di-
rected verdict of acquittal." Id.
" Hodges v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 811, 813-14 (Ky. 1971).
32 See, e.g., Gailey v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1974); Wheeler v.
Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. 1971).
'3 569 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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Robinson was convicted of reckless homicide in connection
with the death of her infant son. She was charged with killing
him by failing to feed him properly and to obtain needed
medical attention. At trial the circuit judge excluded evidence
of the defendant's mental retardation on the ground that, be-
cause such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of
proving an absence of intent, it was irrelevant when the al-
leged offense did not require intent. The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that evidence of the defendant's mental retar-
dation could be presented for consideration by the jury.8 '
Explaining its decision, the court stated that although the
pertinent statute does not require subjective realization of in-
tent, "[t]he failure of a person to perceive a danger when he is
mentally incapable of perceiving it cannot be the basis for
criminal liability." 5 If the prosecution's argument were taken
to its logical conclusion, "total insanity would not be a defense
in a case where the insane person failed to perceive a substan-
tial risk and his failure amounted to a gross deviation from
what a reasonable person would have perceived in the
circumstances." 36
Robinson is a case of first impression in Kentucky. Its
suggestion that evidence of a mental defect37  may be
presented by a defendant charged with unintentional homi-
cide38 implies a judicial dissatisfaction with the rigid objectiv-
34 Id. at 185.
35 Id.
26 Id.
37 The term "mental defect" as used here refers to cases of subnormal mentality.
The term can also be used to refer to a condition of partial insanity or mental disor-
der. In short, "mental defect" can be used to refer to all degrees of mental condition
which can exist between sanity and insanity. Note, Criminal Law-"Partial In-
sanity" As a Means of Reducing an Intentional Homicide to Voluntary Manslaugh-
ter, 37 Ky. L.J. 412 (1948-1949); Note, The Effects of Mental Defects Amounting to
Less Than Insanity Upon Criminal Responsibility, 31 Ky. L.J. 83 (1942-1943).
28 The Kentucky Penal Code defines two types of unintentional homicide: man-
slaughter in the second degree, KRS § 507.040 (1975), and reckless homicide, KRS §
507.050 (1975). Manslaughter in the second degree is the wanton killing of another.
KRS § 507.040(1) (1975). The penal code defines wantonly as follows:
A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance de-
scribed by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or
that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree
1979-1980]
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ity of the reasonable man standard in the context of criminal
liability. The following discussion will examine this new devel-
opment in the law and analyze its impact on unintentional
homicide under the Kentucky Penal Code.
A. Historical Judicial Treatment of Evidence of Mental
Defect
Use of evidence of a mental defect has existed in some
form since the mid-nineteenth century and is variously la-
belled as the doctrine of partial insanity, diminished responsi-
bility, diminished capacity, feeble-mindedness, mental weak-
ness, or mental defect. 9 Regardless of the terminology used,
the basic concept is the same. A person who is not insane, who
can distinguish right from wrong and realize that a particular
act is in violation of the law, and who does not suffer from an
irresistable impulse, may yet be so manifestly deficient in his
powers of deliberation, judgment and self-control 0 that he
commits criminal acts despite his desire not to do so.41
Accepting the existence of this gray area between sanity
that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person
who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary
intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto.
KRS § 501.020(4) (1975). Reckless homicide is the reckless killing of another person.
KRS § 507.050(1) (1975). "Recklessly" is defined thusly:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance de-
scribed by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance
exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation.
KRS § 501.020(4) (1975).
39 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 850 (2d ed. 1969); Weihofen, Partial Insanity and
Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. REV. 505 (1930); Note, Criminal Law: Abnormal Mental
Condition and Diminished Criminal Responsibility, 23 OxLA. L. Rv. 93 (1970);
Note, Criminal Law-"Partial Insanity" As A Means of Reducing An Intentional
Homicide To Voluntary Manslaughter, 37 Ky. L.J. 412 (1948-1949); Note, The Ef-
fects of Mental Defects Amounting to Less Than Insanity Upon Criminal Responsi-
bility, 31 Ky. L.J. 83 (1942-1943); Comment, Criminal Law-Partial In-
sanity-Evidentiary Relevance Defined, 16 RUTGERS L. R.v. 174 (1961-62).
40 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 507.
41 See Sparks, "Diminished Responsibility" in Theory and Practice, 27 MOD. L.
REv. 9, 11 (1964).
[Vol. 68
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and insanity, the law has developed several procedures for
weighing a defendant's subnormal mental ability in determin-
ing his guilt and resultant punishment. Usually evidence of a
defendant's deficient mental ability is used to negate the ele-
ment of intent under the theory that such a defendant is inca-
pable of possessing the requisite intent."2 The defense of di-
minished responsibility 3 is not a complete defense, however,
because even if raised successfully it will not result in an ac-
quittal." Instead it serves to reduce the degree of the crime. 5
For example, evidence of a defendant's diminished capacity
can negate the elements of intent and premeditation in a mur-
der prosecution, thereby reducing the offense to voluntary
manslaughter.' 8
Some jurisdictions which reject the doctrine of dimin-
ished responsibility will allow evidence of the defendant's de-
fective mental condition to be introduced for the purpose of
mitigating punishment.47 The Model Penal Code, for example,
contains an optional provision allowing a reduction of the
death penalty to life imprisonment where the defective
mental condition is proved to be causally related to the
481crime. Only a minority of states allowing evidence of the de-
fendant's mental condition to be introduced have adopted the
mitigation of punishment doctrine, possibly because of doubts
42 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 516-20.
43 As noted in the text accompanying note 39, supra, the terminology in this area
is varied. For purposes of this article the doctrine (or defense) of diminished respon-
sibility means the use of evidence of the defendant's mental defect to negate the
element of intent.
" Weihofen, supra note 39, at 516-20.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Annot., 22 A.L.R. 3d 1229, 1243-46 (1968).
41 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(2) (1962) provides:
Whenever the jury or the Court is authorized to determine or to recom-
mend whether or not the defendant shall be sentenced to death or impris-
onment upon conviction, evidence that the capacity of the defendant to ap-
preciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental dis-
ease or defect is admissible in favor of sentence of imprisonment.
The Model Penal Code alternatively provides: "Evidence that the defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense." Id.
§ 4.02(1).
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concerning the judiciary's ability to implement it effectively
and the belief that such a task is more properly the function
of the legislature.41 Still, the mitigation theory has some sup-
port, as a few courts have chosen to implement Joth it and
the doctrine of diminished capacity.50
While diminished responsibility and mitigation of punish-
ment conceptually are separate theories, in effect they are
quite similar.5 1 Reducing the degree of the charged offense
necessarily results in lessening the punishment. The advan-
tage of the mitigation of punishment doctrine is that it allows
receipt of evidence of a defendant's mental defect in cases in
which the offense charged does not include a lesser degree 2
Further, even if the offense does have varying degrees of
blameworthiness, once the existence of a mental defect is
proved, the court may tailor the defendant's punishment to
reflect the extent to which his mental defect caused the crimi-
nal behavior.5 3 Thus the courts can structure the punishment
to fit the particular criminal, a practice much in line with the
modern development of criminal law."
1. Historical Use of Evidence of Mental Defect in
Kentucky
The doctrine of diminished responsibility was first ap-
plied in Kentucky at the turn of the century. Early cases es-
tablished that evidence of a defendant's mental defect, if
proved to be causally related to the commission of the crime,
could be used to reduce the degree of the offense by negating
a necessary element of the higher crime.55 For example, in
49 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 521.
80 Jurisdictions which have adopted both the doctrine of diminished responsibil-
ity and mitigation of punishment are New Jersey and Oregon. Annot., 22 A.L.I. 3d
1228, 1233-46 (1968).
51 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 523.
52 See id. at 524-25.
53 Id.
4 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 510.
15 See Note, Criminal Law-"Partial Insanity" as a Means of Reducing an In-
tentional Homicide to Voluntary Manslaughter, 37 Ky. L.J. 419 (1948-49); Annot.,
22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584, 586 (1926).
[Vol. 68
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Mangrum v. Commonwealth," the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. Counsel for the defense introduced evidence
that the eighteen year old defendant had no more discretion
than a child of thirteen or fourteen years of age, that he pre-
ferred the company of children, and that when given more
than one task to perform he would forget everything. The
Court of Appeals authorized an instruction that if the jury
were to find the defendant mentally deficient, they were to
weigh the fact in determining the degree of his guilt and any
possible mitigation of his punishment.
57
In a similar case, Rogers v. Commonwealth," a nineteen
year old man was convicted of murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the defendant was entitled to an instruction of voluntary
manslaughter. To determine whether malice existed, the jury
could consider evidence of the defendant's condition, includ-
ing testimony that he was feeble-minded.5 9 Although this pre-
cedent existed, prior to the Robinson decision, 0 Kentucky al-
ways had restricted the use of evidence of a defendant's
mental defects to intentional homicides.
2. The Use of Evidence of Mental Defect in Other
Jurisdictions
In allowing juries to consider evidence of mental defi-
ciency to reduce the grade or degree of the offense, Kentucky
56 39 S.W. 703 (Ky. 1897).
57The instruction given by the court was as follows:
The court instructs the jury, further, that if they believe from the evi-
dence that defendant, at the time he shot the deceased, had not mind and
intelligence sufficient to know right from wrong and to understand the na-
ture and consequences of his acts, they should acquit the defendant on the
ground of insanity; and, if they should acquit him on such ground, they
should so state in their verdict; or, if they believe from the evidence that he
was of weak or feeble mind, they should consider that fact in determining
the degree of guilt and the measure of his punishment.
Id. at 704.
-8 27 S.W. 813 (Ky. 1894).
9 Id. at 814.
10 See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the Robinson
facts.
1979-1980]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
is part of a significant minority.61 Twenty-three states now
permit evidence of mental defects to be submitted to the jury
under the doctrines of diminished responsibility and/or miti-
gation of punishment.6 2 In all but one of these jurisdictions,
however, admission of the evidence is restricted to intentional
crimes.6 3 Only Kentucky has expanded the use of the concept
to unintentional crimes.
The remarkable aspect of the use of evidence of the de-
fendant's mental capacity is not that the number of jurisdic-
tions permitting it is so small, but rather that the number is
relatively large, since the doctrines of diminished responsibil-
ity and mitigation of punishment are not constitutionally
mandated. In Fisher v. United States,6 4 the United States Su-
preme Court held that lower courts had not erred in refusing
to hear evidence of the defendant's mental capacity. Denoting
the admission of such evidence as "a radical departure from
the common law,"'6 5 the Court ruled that a decision on the ad-
missibility of this evidence should be left to legislative
discretion.6
61 Note, Criminal Law: Abnormal Mental Condition and Diminished Criminal
Responsibility, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 93, 98 (1970); Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
62 Jurisdictions allowing evidence of mental deficiency to be admitted to deter-
mine the degree of the offense are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228,
1238-43 (1968).
Jurisdictions which permit evidence of mental deficiency to be admitted for the
possibility of mitigating punishment are: Arizona, Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas. Id. at 1243-46.
Jurisdictions which do not permit evidence of mental deficiency to be used to
determine the offense are: Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, West Virginia. Id. at 1235-36.
63 Id.
61 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
65 Id. at 476.
66 The instruction which the Supreme Court rejected was as follows:
If the jury are not satisfied from the evidence that the defendant, at
the time he committed the act, was so mentally unsound as to render him
incapable of judging between right and wrong; yet if the jury find from the
evidence that there was such a degree of mental unsoundness existing at
the time of the homicide as to render the defendant incapable of premedi-
tation and of forming such an intent as the jury believe the circumstances
of this case would reasonably impute to a man of sound mind, they may
consider such degree of mental unsoundness in determining the question
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The Supreme Court's decision undoubtedly curbed exten-
sive development of the doctrines of diminished responsibility
and mitigation of punishment. However, good arguments do
exist for the continuation of both doctrines, for their expan-
sion to unintentional homicides and for their use as a com-
plete defense in some instances. The remaining sections of
this survey will examine these possibilities.
B. A Rationale for the Use of Evidence of Mental Defect in
Cases of Unintentional Homicide
It is generally accepted that the world cannot be divided
neatly into two mutually exclusive groups, the sane and the
insane.17 Rather, there exists a state of "partial insanity"68 be-
tween the two polar classifications. A common characteristic
of these partially insane individuals is that while they are able
to function in society, they occupy its fringes, performing the
lowest paying and least desirable jobs. 9 Although they are
perceived as having the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong, it is also acknowledged that their lives are to a
certain degree out of their control.70 The minds of the par-
whether the act was murder or manslaughter.
Id. at 471 n.9.
67 "No one doubts that there are more possible classifications of mentality than
the sane and the insane." Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 475 (1946).
68 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 508.
[A]U of us probably have met persons who were certainly not insane, but
whom we nevertheless considered "a bit off," or "not quite bright," or per-
haps quite clever and brilliant, but obviously crack-brained none the less.
This great group of borderline types, popularly dismissed as fools, fanatics,
fakers or failures, constitute what we have called the partial or the semi-
insane.
Id.
69 Id.
70 It is characteristic of most of these abnormal conditions not merely that
they may result in untoward or socially harmful behavior, but that they
may interfere with the agent's ability to form or carry out his own conscious
plans of action, and to maximize his own interests. A valid psychiatric diag-
nosis, based on an indeterminate minimum amount of "symptomatic" be-
havior of various recognized kinds, indicates that the person so described is
similar to a class of people who have been similarly identified in the past,
and who have been observed to persist in behaving inappropriately for no
good reason, or who have been incapable of thinking or reasoning correctly
or modifying or controlling their conduct or performing certain actions, de-
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tially insane are like watches "which [are] always gaining oj
losing a little.
'71
Mentally retarded persons are included within this cate-
gorization of mental deficiency,"2 although the term "partial
insanity" is inappropriate to describe their condition. "Mental
retardation has been defined as significantly sub-average gen-
eral intellectual functioning which appears during the devel-
opmental period and produces inadequacy in adaptive behav-
ior. It also includes the inability to fulfill the requirements oi
the social role."'78 This definition does not suggest any positive
correlation between mental retardation and crime, and it has
been argued that no such correlation exists.74 In more simple
terms, the mentally retarded person is perceived as being
someone whose child-like mind and dulled powers of percep-
tion prevent him from fully and correctly understanding the
requirements of mature adult life. 5
This inability of the partially insane and the mentally re-
tarded to assess and comprehend the world around them cor-
rectly and to control their actions adequately is particularly
important in cases of unintentional homicide where statutes
define criminal culpability in terms of risk, 6 calculated by a
standard of awareness. 77 Courts, however, traditionally have
refused to admit evidence of the defendant's mental defects
not amounting to insanity in cases of unintentional crimes.70
They have reasoned that such evidence was irrelevant since
spite having the strongest incentives to do so.
Sparks, "Diminished Responsibility" in Theory and Practice, 27 MOD. L. Rxv. 9, 11
(1964).
71 GRASSET, THE SEMI-INSANE AND THE SEMI-RESPONSMLE 392 (Jelliffe Eng. trans.
1907) (cited in Weihofen, supra note 39, at 509).
72 Note, Criminal Law: Abnormal Mental Condition and Diminished Criminal
Responsibility, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 93, 95 (1970).
73 Id.
74 R. WOODY, LEGAL AsPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION: A SEARCH FOR RELIABIL-
rry 43 (1974).
75 Id. See Weihofen, supra note 39, at 508-09.
" See generally Lawson, Kentucky Penal Code: The Culpable Mental States
and Related Matters, 61 Ky. L.J. 657, 667 (1972-73).
77 See note 38 supra for the text of the Kentucky Penal Code sections defining
the terms "wantonly" and "recklessly".
78 Note, The Effects of Mental Defects Amounting to Less than Insanity Upon
Criminal Responsibility, 31 Ky. L.J. 83, 85 (1942-43).
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its only function is to negate the element of intent, 9 which by
definition is not required to obtain a conviction for an unin-
tentional crime.80 If, however, a person lacks the requisite
ability to formulate intent, why should it be presumed that
such person is capable of perceiving a risk "of gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would ob-
serve in the situation,""' and if he is able to perceive such a
risk, is capable of not proceeding in the face of it? Inability to
appreciate the risk constitutes a reckless mental state while
incapacity to accomplish the latter results in wantonness. 82 It
seems the height of injustice to convict someone with a mental
defect of unintentional homicide, since to do so is to hold the
partially insane and the mentally retarded to the standard of
care of a reasonable person, a standard which by definition
they are unable to attain.
The introduction of evidence of the defendant's mental
capacity will permit a jury to make its determination of guilt
in a better informed fashion and consequently is a more hu-
mane approach. Despite the public popularity of the notion
that persons committing like crimes should receive like pun-
ishment, such a theory rarely is accomplished in practice, as
the jury system alone makes such a result impossible.83 Be-
cause no two juries are alike, cases of unintentional homicide
in which the conduct is essentially the same are likely to vary
widely in result.84 The jury system necessarily results in a cer-
71 Hill v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1931) (defendant carelessly fired
pistol which resulted in death); Held v. Commonwealth, 208 S.W. 772 (Ky. 1919)
(careless use of an automobile, a necessarily dangerous instrumentality, was defined
as culpable); Speaks v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W. 850 (Ky. 1912) (defendant pointed
pistol at decedent and snapped the trigger); Brown v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W. 220
(Ky. 1891) (defendant fired pistol in a room crowded with persons).
80 Note, supra note 78, at 85.
81 KRS § 501.020(4) (1975) (definition of "recklessly").
82 See KRS § 501.020(3), (4) (1975).
83 Weihofen, supra note 39, at 511.
8 This has been illustrated dramatically by two homicide cases in Kentucky in
the last few years. In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1977), the
defendant was convicted of wanton murder under KRS § 507.020(1)(b) (1975). Wan-
ton murder requires a finding that the defendant perceived and disregarded a risk to
life, acting with extreme indifference to life. The jury convicted the defendant under
this statute for driving while drunk, at night with his lights off at a high rate of speed.
The defendant ran a red light at an intersection, killing a woman.
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tain amount of arbitrariness, and if that factor is to be mini-
mized, jurors need to have as much information as possible
upon which to base their determination of guilt.
2. Evidence of Mental Defect and the Theory of Criminal
Punishment
Although fairness to an individual criminal offender is an
important goal of the criminal law, it is not the only purpose.
Indeed, the vast majority of citizens would probably consider
that goal of relatively minor importance. Some commentators
have espoused that, "[t]he broad purposes of the criminal law
are. . to make people do what society regards as desirable
and to prevent them from doing what society considers to be
undesirable." 85 The law accomplishes this end through the
mechanism of punishment; that is, an individual is punished
for improper behavior even though his good behavior is not
necessarily rewarded.86 Since punishment satisfies such an im-
portant function, it is necessary to examine how the admission
of evidence of mental defect in cases of unintentional homi-
cide affects it.
Modern legal theorists hypothesize that punishment
serves to control criminal behavior in a variety of ways . 7 Pun-
ishment deters criminal behavior,s8 and incarceration serves
to isolate convicted criminals from society, preventing them
from committing other crimes.8 During the period of incar-
ceration, the justice system seeks to rehabilitate the criminal
In an unreported case involving William Wilson, a truck driver, the jury returned
a verdict for acquittal. Wilson was transporting gasoline from Louisville to Beat-
tyville, averaging about 70 m.p.h. The government theorized that the truck suffered
"brake fade" whereby brakes overheat from excessive use as when the vehicle is
driven at high speeds on a winding road. The prosecution further hypothesized that
the driver took the truck over the hill in sixth gear. As the truck roared down the hill,
a train was moving to cross the road at the bottom of the hill. The truck barely
missed the train, crossed the tracks, flipped over and exploded, killing seven persons.
Interview with Ray Larson, Sam Isaacs and Barbara Edelnan, Kentucky Attorney
General's Office in Frankfort (1979).
05 W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1972).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 22-24.
" Id. at 22.
89 Id.
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offender, while publicity resulting from the trial and convic-
tion serves to educate the public to the consequences of crimi-
nal behavior.90 Finally, punishment is thought to satisfy the
victim's desire for retribution.9 1
The question arises, however, whether any of these pur-
poses can be accomplished in the case of the partially insane
or mentally retarded offender. If a person commits a criminal
act because he was either unable to control his behavior or
was unable to perceive accurately what he was required to do,
it is doubtful that through punishing him the criminal justice
system accomplishes any of its goals, except perhaps retribu-
tion and physical restraint. Because the origin of his actions is
beyond his control, punishment will not deter the mentally
deficient offender.92 In addition, it is doubtful that a mentally
defective offender's rehabilitation needs can be met in a peni-
tentiary. Finally, the goals of public education and deterrence
can be equally well served by punishing other more culpable
offenders.
If partially insane or mentally retarded offenders are not
punished as ordinary criminals, what is to be done with them?
This aspect of the problem subjects the doctrines of dimin-
ished responsibility and mitigation of punishment to their se-
verest criticism, for the ultimate effect of both procedures is
to return to the street in a shortened period of time the very
offender society is least likely to be able to deter and con-
trol. 3 The development of some program of treatment for
these defendants is imperative, although the lack of success of
such programs in cases of insane defendants is not very
encouraging."
"o Id. at 23.
0, Id. at 24.
02 "Abnormal mental condition is not volitional. Such conditions are acquired by
injury, illness or through genetic defects." Note, supra note 72, at 98.
Weihofen, supra note 39, at 525-26.
o' Some scholars who have studied the use of psychotherapy in the treatment of
criminal offenders are optimistic about the future success of such programs. But for
the present they are forced to concede that "[iun spite of the enormous effort that has
gone into treatment of the mentally ill, there is no scientific proof of the effectiveness
of psychotherapy ... land] there are even less objective data to prove the effective-
ness of psychotherapy with offenders than there are with the mentally il." S. HAL-
LECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 338-39 (1967).
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The solution to dealing with the partially insane defen-
dant is not simple, but in some cases, viable alternatives are
available. The Robinson case provides a good example. Upon
a finding by the court that Ms. Robinson was mentally inca-
pable of caring for her children, a court order could be ob-
tained terminating her parental rights and declaring any chil-
dren in her custody to be wards of the state. 5 If the
defendant's character was nonviolent, this possibility coupled
with some form of care or treatment program might well pro-
vide an effective solution.
3. Judicial Problems with the Admission of Evidence of
Mental Defects
A final problem with the admission of evidence of mental
defects is that the courts may not be the proper forum for
determining the proper societal response to mentally defective
persons' criminal behavior."6 It is arguable that the legislature,
The difficulties in handling the psychopathic personality are enormous. The
problems stem not only from a lack of money, sufficient facilities, and time, but also
from the tremendous complexity of the endeavor. The criminal personality is seldom
warmly receptive to either his therapist or his treatment program.
[P]sychopathy may be considered as basically a remedial condition. How-
ever, the complexities introduced by the peculiar sociopsychological rela-
tions of the psychopath to his society make therapy difficult or even haz-
ardous. Social defenses are so strongly entrenched, reality circumstances
are so infiltrated with negative attitudes, and such infinite patience and re-
sourcefulness are required of the therapist that spectacular results cannot
be expected in the treatment of this socially.destructive group of neuroti-
cally ill persons.
W. BROMBERG, CRIME AND THE MIND 198 (1948).
95 KRS § 199.600 (1977).
"The problem of classifying, assessing and analyzing the results of the ap-
plication of modern psychiatry to administration of criminal law as it re-
lates to gradations of punishment according to the relative intelligence of
the defendant is beyond the competence of the judiciary. Courts are neither
trained nor equipped for this delicate and important task. The basic frame-
work for sentences of punishment must be established by the legislative
branch. Indeed, one can hardly conceive of a process less suited to formu-
lating general rules in this sensitive area, than an adversary proceeding.
That must be done by long range studies by competent public and quasi-
public entities and by legislative committees with trained staffs aided by
objective technical and scientific witnesses who can deal with all aspects of
the problem, not confined as we are to the facts of an individual case. In
this process legislative committees can call upon the best scientific re-
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which can take advantage of a wide variety of informational
sources, is better equipped to make such decisions.
Whatever the force of this argument in other jurisdictions, it
has minimal validity in Kentucky, where courts have been
making these very findings in cases of intentional homicide for
years. Furthermore, it is anomalous to contend that factual
considerations of a defendant's mental state are too complex
for a jury in cases of partial insanity or mental retardation
when these same problems are inherent in the entire insanity
issue."8 A decision on the existence of either insanity or some
lesser abnormal mental condition requires a determination of
whether the abnormal mental state was causally related to the
commission of the offense,99 which requires reliance on ex-
perts to a substantial degree.100 If the courts are competent to
make these judgments of insanity in cases of intentional
homicide, they are no less competent to make decisions of
partial insanity.
CONCLUSION
Admitting evidence of a defendant's mental defect in
cases of unintentional homicide possesses many positive fea-
tures. Most significant is the resulting fairness to the defen-
dant, who should not be held accountable for actions that
were obviously dangerous to the average individual but which
he was mentally incapable of perceiving as such. It is not in-
congruous to believe that Ms. Robinson sincerely meant to
care for her child yet did not possess the mental ability to
effect the result she desired. If this was truly the case, she
should not be convicted of reckless homicide and imprisoned.
The admission of evidence of a mental defect is also im-
portant because incarceration of partially insane or mentally
retarded offenders probably benefits neither society nor the
sources of the country without limit as has been done in studies conducted
by Royal Commissions in England and Canada.
Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
97 Id.
08 See Weihofen, supra note 39, at 521-23.
09 Id. at 521.
100 Id. at 522.
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offender. Further, it is unlikely that the judicial process will
be unduly burdened by the introduction of evidence of partial
insanity and mental retardation. Juries have been deciding
complex questions of insanity for years. Questions of partial
insanity and mental retardation should pose no greater
problems.
The real criticism to the admission of this evidence is
that it unleashes a class of persons who are partially, and in
some instances perhaps fully, "judgment-proof". These per-
sons may commit crimes almost with impunity because the
court, in its sense of justice, will not hold them blameworthy,
yet their mental condition is something that society is at pres-
ent without sufficient knowledge or funds either to control or
improve. The problem is a difficult one-one in which it is not
possible to provide a definitive answer. A partial solution, fair-
ness to the defendant, seems at present the only solution.
